One narrative suggests that the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) had become a symbol of resistance against authoritarian forces in the current era. Despite repeated efforts by powerful circles, Imran Khan was reportedly unwilling to agree to any deal, whether it involved withdrawing from politics, travelling abroad for medical treatment, or being transferred to Bani Gala, which would be declared a sub-jail.

We saw that Bushra Bibi was once transferred to Bani Gala because she was a woman. However, instead of accepting her home as a sub-jail, she filed a petition in the High Court seeking her transfer to Adiala Jail.

What could have been the reasoning behind this request? One possibility was political point-scoring by refusing to accept any concession offered by the government. Another was that, since Khan was also in jail, she might have had more opportunities to meet him and take part in political consultations and decision-making.

However, Bushra Bibi’s decision did not produce any significant results. Even during protests, speeches, or demands for release and meetings, her name was hardly mentioned by any party leader or worker. As a result, she was unable to establish a significant political standing of her own.

When she was released on bail, she chose to settle in Peshawar rather than Bani Gala. The purpose was to live in a province where her party was in government and develop a strategy for Khan’s release through consultations with party leaders. This was considered a strong political move.

While there, a long march towards Islamabad was organised under the joint leadership of Bushra Bibi and the then Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Ali Amin Gandapur, to secure Khan’s release. It is a fact that this was an effective political move. The government and those in power were under considerable pressure. The march leadership was offered the option of staging a sit-in outside Islamabad and pursuing negotiations, through which a path towards Khan’s conditional release could be explored.

The tragedy, however, is that PTI lacks political pragmatism and places great confidence in its public support. There is no doubt that the party enjoys a level of public backing that perhaps only Quaid-e-Azam had experienced in the past. However, it has failed to use this support effectively. It is like having a cannon but not knowing how to operate it—or firing it in the wrong direction.

The public strength that accompanied the party could have been used to put pressure on the government from outside Islamabad while directing that pressure towards the corridors of power through negotiations. This might have led to a major success, potentially allowing Khan to conduct active politics from the sub-jail at Bani Gala instead of remaining in solitary confinement.

However, PTI’s available public support had created the illusion that it could confront the most powerful state by taking unarmed citizens into the streets. The party failed to understand that an unarmed group cannot confront a state on equal terms; only a state can confront another state. Even wars between states eventually end through negotiations.

Rejecting the government’s proposal, Bushra Bibi addressed the people of Peshawar and sought a commitment from them that they would reach D-Chowk under all circumstances and would not leave until Khan had been released.

According to an unconfirmed report, the then Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur was willing to accept the government’s offer. However, Bushra Bibi, whose political experience was limited at the time, rejected the proposal and obtained a commitment from the participants to stand firm, even if it cost them their lives.

The convoy moved forward, crossed the entry point at Islamabad’s 26 Number Chungi, passed through Zero Point and reached the Centaurus Mall intersection, only a few metres from D-Chowk. There, a large contingent of law enforcement personnel blocked the convoy’s path and conveyed a clear message to the leadership: they would have to ensure their own safety.

The sun had set, and all the lights were switched off. During the blackout, Gandapur and Bushra Bibi disappeared, while the participants who had promised to sacrifice their lives remained in place, believing that their leadership was still with them.

Gunshots were then heard, panic spread, and a stampede broke out. Contact with the leadership had been lost, and people could not find their way. Using the lights on their mobile phones, participants fled on foot in different directions, leaving behind both official and private vehicles. No one returned to claim those vehicles.

The government claimed that aerial firing had taken place, while PTI alleged that direct firing had occurred and several participants had lost their lives. However, no bodies or claimants emerged. PTI’s leadership did appear in public, but the following morning, in Haripur, the then Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur held a news conference and said that, while the firing was taking place, he was travelling through the Margalla route and entering Khyber Pakhtunkhwa after crossing 36 districts.

In any case, blame for the failure began to be shifted from one person to another, and Gandapur lost the party’s confidence. Bushra Bibi was arrested again. Some time later, Khan changed the leadership of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from within jail and nominated Sohail Afridi as chief minister.

Sohail Afridi became chief minister and took up the task of securing Khan’s release. However, the policy remained unchanged, and the same inflexible approach continued. If the leadership had changed, the strategy should also have changed. Initially, Afridi too attempted to lead groups towards Adiala Jail, but they were not allowed to cross even the Dahgal checkpoint.

Time passed, and promises continued. Eventually, a final protest movement was announced, but before the scheduled date, it was postponed for a month. During that month, momentum was built, and the campaign reached its peak.

The September 27 long march was portrayed as such a major threat that the federal government began closing roads a week in advance. Members of the public and informed circles strongly criticised the government’s policy, questioning the wisdom of shutting down the country as soon as PTI announced a protest. The argument was that the party could achieve its objective merely by making a verbal announcement.

The state understood the situation and changed its strategy. It sent a clear message to PTI’s serious-minded leadership: end the march and come to the negotiating table, otherwise the party would not even be allowed to cross the border of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The message was so clear and firm that senior leadership, particularly Akbar Bugti, announced their withdrawal of support for the march, saying they could not put the lives of young people at risk and that negotiations should be pursued.

Negotiations took place, but the march was not cancelled. Instead, it was postponed until October 4 under the strategy that if the government continued blocking roads for another week, the march date could be pushed back further.

However, the state had also reached a final decision. Rather than merely blocking roads, it had decided to shut down PTI itself. The party’s leadership, which lacked political foresight, failed to recognise this, and negotiations broke down.

The march began, but it no longer carried the same force as before. It was restricted to the borders of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, creating further disappointment.

The federal government advised the provincial administration to work against terrorism, improve governance, and provide development opportunities and employment to the public. It also promised cooperation in these areas. However, Sohail Afridi did not agree. His sole agenda remained Imran Khan’s release.

The state then used the provincial government’s alleged lack of cooperation in addressing rising terrorism as justification for imposing an emergency and governor’s rule under Articles 232 and 234 of the Constitution, taking the chief minister and the entire leadership into custody.

It was expected that the move would trigger strong public resistance. Contrary to those expectations, however, no one came out to protest. Instead, sweets were distributed in several districts to celebrate the end of a government, and people expressed relief that the politics of sit-ins and protests had come to an end.

In this way, the perception that PTI could draw on overwhelming public support was also shattered. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, regarded as the party’s stronghold, was also lost. The federal government now has complete control over the province. For the time being, the situation is normal, while the provincial leadership remains in custody.

It appears that, with Sohail Afridi’s contribution, the final nail has been driven into PTI’s coffin. PTI supporters, however, argue that the final nail has been driven into the coffin of democracy.

Time will tell who stood on the right side of history.